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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-2209 
______________ 
  
*SAID HASSEN; KAREN HASSEN, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS;  
VIRGIN ISLANDS BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 
*Amended Per Clerk’s Order of 05/08/2017 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 3-15-cv-00038) 
District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gómez 
______________ 
 
Argued May 2, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
 
(Filed: June 26, 2017) 
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______________ 
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______________ 
 
Alexander Golubitsky, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Marjorie Rawls Roberts, P.C. 
P.O. Box 6347 
St. Thomas, VI 00804 
 
  Counsel for Appellants 
 
Claude Earl Walker, Esq. 
Pamela R. Tepper, Esq. 
Su-Layne U. Walker, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Office of Attorney General of Virgin Islands 
Department of Justice 
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade 
GERS Complex, 2nd Floor 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
 
  Counsel for Appellees 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Said and Karen Hassen (“the Hassens”) appeal the 
District Court’s order dismissing their claim against the 
Government of the United States Virgin Islands (“USVI”) 
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (“BIR”) for imposing 
allegedly wrongful levies on their property in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7433(a).  To bring a claim under § 7433(a), a 
taxpayer must exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in 
§ 7433(d).  While such exhaustion is not a jurisdictional 
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requirement, it is mandatory.  Here, we need not decide 
whether the Hassens fulfilled this requirement because their 
complaint fails to plead a violation of § 7433(a).  Thus, we 
will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing their 
complaint.   
 
I 
  
The BIR sent the Hassens a final notice of intent to 
levy their property to satisfy an outstanding tax debt of 
$5,778.32 for the 2004 tax year.  Subsequently, on March 8, 
2013, the BIR issued a levy against the Hassens’ property at 
First Bank Virgin Islands (“Levy 1”).  
On June 11, 20131 and December 26,  
                                                                
1 The letter stated, in pertinent part, that: 
This letter is written on behalf of our 
clients Said and Karen [Hassen] (the 
“Taxpayers”) in order to request an installment 
agreement for the Taxpayers and to request a 
transcript of assessments and payments for all 
years for which the Taxpayers owe taxes, which 
we believe to be 2004 only.  Previously, our 
office has requested a transcript for this tax 
year.  The records of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (the “BIR”) indicate that the 
Taxpayers owe five thousand, eight hundred 
and twelve dollars and seventy six cents 
($5,812.76), inclusive of all interest and 
penalties, for the 2004 tax year and have no 
other liability to the BIR.  Enclosed herein as 
Attachment 1, please find Form 2848, Power of 
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20132, the Hassens submitted letters requesting an installment 
                                                                                                                                               
Attorney for the Taxpayers.  
While we are still awaiting the transcript 
of the Taxpayers’ return to determine the actual 
liability of the Taxpayers, all parties agree that 
the Taxpayers owe less than $10,000 in total, 
and have filed all required returns.  
Accordingly, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6159(c) requires 
that an installment agreement be entered into, so 
long as that installment agreement completely 
pays the liability within three years.  Therefore, 
we are proposing an installment agreement 
payment of $161 per month, which will 
completely pay this alleged liability within three 
years.  Please consider this a request for an 
installment agreement, and therefore, please 
cease all enforced collections actions against 
these Taxpayers during the time this installment 
agreement is being considered, per 26 CFR § 
301.6331-4(a).  Should this installment 
agreement be unacceptable to the BIR for any 
reason, please notify us in writing as soon as 
possible.  Additionally, this offer for an 
installment agreement is conditioned upon the 
release of the levies issued against the 
Taxpayers.  
 
Supp. App. 1-2 (emphasis omitted).   
 2 That letter stated, in pertinent part, that: 
This letter is written on behalf of our 
clients Said and Karen [Hassen] (the 
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agreement to satisfy their 2004 tax debt.3  The December 
                                                                                                                                               
“Taxpayers”) in response to your letter dated 
October 31, 2013 and our telephone 
conversation regarding that letter of December 
12, 2013.  The purpose of this letter is two-fold.  
First, the purpose of this letter is to confirm that 
the Taxpayers have no income tax filing 
requirement for 2005 and 2006, and even if they 
did, this should not interfere with their proposed 
installment agreement.  Second, this letter is [a] 
request for a formal response to our request for 
an installment agreement dated June 11, 2013, 
and attached to this letter as Attachment 1 . . . . 
Additionally, we are requesting a formal 
response to our installment agreement request 
of June 11, 2013.  During our phone 
conversation on December 12, 2013, you 
indicated that the BIR would move forward 
with a levy.  We do not believe that a levy can 
lawfully occur at this time.  You stated that a 
taxpayer must use a Form 9465 to request an 
installment agreement.  We respectfully 
disagree. 
 
Supp. App 12, 14 (emphasis omitted).  
3 The Court may consider the contents of these letters 
because they were attached to the complaint as exhibits.  See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that, when 
reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts consider “allegations 
contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint 
and matters of public record”).   
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2013 letter reflects that the Hassens and the BIR engaged in 
discussions concerning their request and outstanding tax 
liability, and that the BIR directed the Hassens to submit an 
IRS Form 9465 to request an installment agreement.  The 
Hassens failed to do so but nevertheless allege that the BIR 
has never accepted or rejected their proposed installment 
agreement.  Thereafter, the BIR issued four additional levies 
against the Hassens’ accounts.   
 
 Rather than file an administrative claim as required by 
26 U.S.C. § 7433(d) and 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433-1, the Hassens 
filed a complaint against the USVI and BIR for imposing 
allegedly wrongful levies on their property in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7433(a) on the theory that the additional levies 
violated 26 U.S.C. § 6331(k)(2), which prohibits the issuance 
of any levy while a proposed installment agreement is 
pending.  
  
 The USVI and BIR moved to dismiss the Hassens’ 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and (b)(6).  With respect to their motion under Rule 
12(b)(1), the USVI and BIR argued that the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Hassens failed 
to exhaust their administrative remedies.  The USVI and BIR 
also sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  The District Court determined that exhaustion was 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite and that dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(1) was therefore not warranted, but found that the 
Hassens did not exhaust their administrative remedies, which 
is a condition to obtain relief, and, as a result, dismissed their 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  The Hassens appeal.   
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II4 
 
A 
 
Because we must ensure that the District Court and our 
Court have jurisdiction over a case before addressing the 
merits, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 
83, 94-95 (1998), we first review the District Court’s 
conclusion that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a claim under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7433.  Section 7433(a) allows a taxpayer to “bring a civil 
action for damages” where an “officer or employee of the 
Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by 
reason of negligence, disregards any provision of” Title 26 or 
its regulations.  26 U.S.C. § 7433(a).  Section 7433(d)(1) 
provides that a “judgment for damages shall not be awarded . 
. . unless the court determines that plaintiff has exhausted the 
administrative remedies available to such plaintiff within the 
Internal Revenue Service.” 
 
 More than two decades ago, in Venen v. United States, 
38 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1994), we characterized this 
exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional.  Since then, as one 
court put it, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned 
against confusing “mandatory requirements of a cause of 
action” with a jurisdictional prerequisite “over that cause of 
action.”  Hoogerheide v. IRS, 637 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 
2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 
(2006)).  To avoid this confusion, the Court established the 
                                                                
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 
U.S.C. § 1612.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
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following “administrable bright line” rule to determine if a 
statute establishes a jurisdictional requirement: 
 
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold 
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be 
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 
with the issue . . . .  But when Congress does 
not rank a statutory limitation as jurisdictional, 
courts should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character. 
 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (internal footnote omitted). 
 
 Thus, under Arbaugh, we “examine statutes to 
determine if they speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any 
way to the jurisdiction of the courts.”  Rubel v. Comm’r, 856 
F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citation omitted).  This requires that we 
consider the “text, context, and relevant historical treatment” 
of the provision.  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 
154, 166 (2010).  As we recently explained, “[i]n examining 
the text, we look at the plain language to determine if it 
speaks in jurisdictional terms, meaning whether it speaks ‘to 
the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations 
of the parties.’”  Rubel, 856 F.3d at 304 (quoting Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)).  We will 
therefore examine the language and context of § 7433(d) to 
determine whether its exhaustion requirement is 
jurisdictional. 
 
There are several predicates to bringing suit and 
obtaining damages under § 7433.  Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 
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636.  Of course, the taxpayer must allege that an IRS 
employee or officer recklessly, intentionally, or negligently 
violated any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.  26 
U.S.C. § 7433(a).  To award damages, the Court must 
“determine[] that the” taxpayer has exhausted the IRS’ 
administrative remedies.  Id. § 7433(d)(1).  To exhaust such 
remedies, the taxpayer must submit an administrative claim to 
the appropriate representative, which includes, among other 
things, the dollar amount of the claim, a description of the 
injuries the taxpayer sustained, and the taxpayer’s contact 
information.  26 C.F.R. § 301.7433.1(e)(1)-(2).   
 
None of these requirements “speak in jurisdictional 
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district 
court[].”  Zipes v. Transworld Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 
(1982).  Furthermore, there is “no language suggesting that 
Congress intended to strip federal courts of jurisdiction when 
plaintiffs do not exhaust administrative remedies.”  Gray v. 
United States, 723 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).  Rather, § 
7433(d)’s exhaustion requirement “establishes a condition—
exhaustion—that plaintiffs ordinarily must satisfy before 
filing a claim” for damages.  Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 637 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting 
Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 158); see also Gray, 723 F.3d at 
798 (stating exhaustion of administrative remedies is “a 
statutory requirement for recovery” under § 7433(a)).  Thus, a 
taxpayer’s failure to exhaust, as required by § 7433(d), bars a 
suit for damages under § 7433(a).  However, “[p]rohibiting a 
judgment for damages is not the same as forbidding any suit 
or proceeding from being maintained in any court.  The latter 
is jurisdictional; the former is not.”  Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 
638 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, like the 
registration requirement to institute a copyright suit, Reed, 
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559 U.S. at 169, exhaustion under § 7433(d) is a 
nonjurisdictional requirement that imposes an obligation a 
plaintiff must fulfill before filing a suit for damages, 
Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 637.   
 
Moreover, the context in which § 7433(d) appears 
demonstrates that it is not jurisdictional.  As the Hoogerheide 
court observed, a comparison of § 7433(d) with the language 
in a neighboring provision also shows § 7433(d) is 
nonjurisdictional.  637 F.3d at 638.  Section 7422(a) provides 
that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court 
for the recovery of any internal revenue tax . . . until a claim . 
. . has been duly filed with the Secretary.”  26 U.S.C. § 
7422(a).  This language embodies a condition that must be 
satisfied for a court to entertain a case.  Moreover, § 7422(e) 
uses the word “jurisdiction” in the same section and 
conditions the district court’s continued authority on certain 
events.  Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 638; see also 26 U.S.C. § 
7422(e) (“If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, 
the district court or the United States Court of Federal Claims, 
as the case may be, shall lose jurisdiction.”).  Section 7433(d) 
lacks similar language that would “tie[] a district court’s 
authority over a claim to a plaintiff’s exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.” Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 638.  
 
Thus, applying Arbaugh’s directive and considering 
that § 7433(d) does not speak in jurisdictional terms or 
convey that Congress intended to permit a court to exercise 
jurisdiction only if the claim was exhausted, we join our sister 
circuits and hold that § 7433(d)’s exhaustion requirement is 
not jurisdictional and hence need not be satisfied for the 
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district court to entertain a claim under § 7433(a).5  Gray, 723 
F.3d at 798; Hoogerheide, 637 F.3d at 636-38; see also Kim 
v. United States, 632 F.3d 713, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (treating 
§ 7433(d) as an affirmative defense, and by implication not 
viewing it as a jurisdictional prerequisite).   
 
B 
 
Having determined that exhaustion under § 7433(d) 
does not impact our jurisdiction, we next consider whether 
the District Court appropriately dismissed the Hassens’ 
complaint.  We exercise plenary review of a district court’s 
order granting a motion to dismiss, Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), and because our 
review is plenary, “we may affirm on any grounds supported 
by the record,” Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 
& N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015).  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint based upon the Hassens’ 
failure to fulfill § 7433(d)’s exhaustion requirement.  Even if 
                                                                
 5 Although IOP 9.1 says that a subsequent panel 
cannot overrule a prior panel’s precedential opinion, “this rule 
gives way when the prior panel’s holding is in conflict with 
Supreme Court precedent.”  Mennen Co. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 147 F.3d 287, 295 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998); Nationwide Ins. v. 
Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing that 
“[o]rdinarily, a panel of this court is bound to follow the 
holdings of published opinions of prior panels of this court 
unless overruled by the court [e]n banc or the holding is 
undermined by a subsequent Supreme Court case”).  Arbaugh 
is such a precedent and thus, we are no longer bound by 
Venen’s holding that the exhaustion requirement is 
jurisdictional.       
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the Hassens satisfied the exhaustion requirement, their 
complaint does not state a claim and was properly dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6).   
 
When examining whether a complaint should be 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we must determine whether 
the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  In evaluating 
plausibility, “we disregard rote recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory 
statements.”  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 
679 (3d Cir. 2012).  A claim “has facial plausibility when the 
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. 
Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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To determine the sufficiency of a complaint,  
[f]irst, the court must take note of the elements 
a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.  Second, 
the court should identify allegations that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth.  Finally, 
where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 
a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement for relief. 
 
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations 
omitted) (drawing steps from Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). 
 
 The Hassens’ complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  As stated previously, the 
Hassens bring a claim against the USVI and the BIR under 
§ 7433(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.6  Section 7433(a) 
provides: 
 
If, in connection with any collection of Federal 
tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or 
employee of the Internal Revenue Service [or 
the BIR] recklessly or intentionally, or by 
reason of negligence, disregards any provision 
                                                                
6 The USVI is a “mirror code” jurisdiction.  This 
means that the USVI adopts the tax provisions set forth in 
Title 26 of the United States Code and replaces all references 
to the “United States” with “Virgin Islands.”  Vento v. Dir. of 
V.I. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 715 F.3d 455, 465 (3d Cir. 
2013).     
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of this title, or any regulation promulgated 
under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil 
action for damages against the United States [or 
the Virgin Islands] in a district court of the 
United States. 
 
26 U.S.C. § 7433(a).  Thus, in a case against the BIR, the 
elements of a § 7433(a) claim are:  
 
(1) that an employee or officer of the BIR7;  
 
(2) disregarded a provision of Title 26 or its 
regulations8; 
 
 (3) in a reckless, intentional, or negligent manner.   
Id.  The Hassens attempt to establish the second element of 
their § 7433 claim by alleging that the BIR disregarded § 
6331(k) of the Code.  This provision prohibits the BIR from 
issuing a levy while a proposed “installment agreement . . .  is 
pending.”9  Id. § 6331(k). 
                                                                
7 A plaintiff asserting a § 7433 claim in a non-mirror 
code jurisdiction would need to identify an employee or 
officer of the IRS. 
8 Gray, 723 F.3d at 802 (stating that plaintiff must 
allege a statute or regulation violated in connection with the 
collection of her taxes). 
9 Section 6331(k) provides, in relevant part, 
that: “[n]o levy may be made    . . . on the property or 
rights to property of any person with respect to any 
unpaid tax . . . during the period that an offer by such 
person for an installment agreement under section 
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 The complaint is deficient in several ways.  Among 
other things, it contains legal conclusions that are not entitled 
to the assumption of truth.  James, 700 F.3d at 679 (“[W]e 
disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.”).  
Specifically, the Hassens claim that the BIR acted 
“purposefully or negligently” and that “an installment 
agreement was pending.”  App. 15, Compl. ¶ 28.   
 
Naked allegations of “negligent” or “purposeful” 
conduct at the pleading stage, without supporting facts, are to 
be disregarded. See Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 
F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that allegations that 
“defendants’ actions were ‘willful’, ‘intentional and 
deliberate’, and with ‘reckless disregard of [the victim’s] 
rights’” are conclusory allegations (alterations in the 
original)); see also Steele v. First Nat’l Bank of Mifflintown, 
963 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (holding that 
allegations that defendant “acted willfully and recklessly 
and/or negligently” are conclusory and the court “need not 
accept [them] as true for purposes of ruling on a motion to 
dismiss” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The complaint 
contains such legal conclusions and presents no facts upon 
which such conclusions could be reached.  Because the 
complaint failed to sufficiently plead a violation of § 7433(a), 
the District Court correctly dismissed it.  
   
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order. 
                                                                                                                                               
6159 for payment of such unpaid tax is pending with 
the Secretary.”   26 U.S.C. § 6331(k)(2). 
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